Abstract

Judicial oversight of the Indonesian Constitutional Court (MK) has faced major challenges since Constitutional Court Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006, which annulled the Judicial Commission’s (KY) authority to supervise constitutional judges. Since then, oversight has been conducted only internally through the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court (MKMK), which has proven ineffective due to potential conflicts of interest and limited constitutional legitimacy. This research adopts a normative legal method with three approaches: statute, conceptual, and comparative. The findings reveal that the current oversight system cannot ensure both judicial independence and accountability. Therefore, reconstructing the model is crucial, with three possible options: (1) restoring limited supervisory authority to KY, (2) institutionalizing MKMK as a permanent independent body with a strong legal basis, or (3) establishing a new external supervisory institution specifically for constitutional judges. Such reconstruction is vital to safeguard the integrity of MK’s decisions and strengthen public trust in constitutional justice.

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